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On Poesy Or Art^1
On Poesy Or Art^1
[Footnote 1: Delivered as a lecture in 1818.]
Man communicates by articulation of sounds, and paramountly by the memory
in the ear; nature by the impression of bounds and surfaces on the eye, and
through the eye it gives significance and appropriation, and thus the
conditions of memory, or the capability of being remembered, to sounds,
smells, etc. Now Art, used collectively for painting, sculpture, architecture,
and music, is the mediatress between, and reconciler of nature and man. It is,
therefore, the power of humanizing nature, of infusing the thoughts and
passions of man into everything which is the object of his contemplation;
color, form, motion, and sound, are the elements which it combines, and it
stamps them into unity in the mould of a moral idea.
The primary art is writing; - primary, if we regard the purpose
abstracted from the different modes of realizing it, those steps of
progression of which the instances are still visible in the lower degrees of
civilization. First, there is mere gesticulation; then rosaries or wampum;
then picture-language; then hieroglyphics, and finally alphabetic letters.
These all consist of a translation of man into nature, of a substitution of
the visible for the audible.
The so-called music of savage tribes as little deserves the name of art
for the understanding as the ear warrants it for music. Its lowest state is a
mere expression of passion by sounds which the passion itself necessitates; -
the highest amounts to no more than a voluntary reproduction of these sounds
in the absence of the occasioning causes, so as to give the pleasure of
contrast - for example, by the various outcries of battle in the song of
security and triumph. Poetry also is purely human; for all its materials are
from the mind, and all its products are for the mind. But it is the apotheosis
of the former state, in which by excitement of the associative power passion
itself imitates order, and the order resulting produces a pleasurable passion,
and thus it elevates the mind by making its feelings the object of its
reflection. So likewise, while it recalls the sights and sounds that had
accompanied the occasions of the original passions, poetry impregnates them
with an interest not their own by means of the passions, and yet tempers the
passion by the calming power which all distinct images exert on the human
soul. In this way poetry is the preparation for art, inasmuch as it avails
itself of the forms of nature to recall, to express, and to modify the
thoughts and feelings of the mind.
Still, however, poetry can only act through the intervention of
articulate speech, which is so peculiarly human that in all languages it
constitutes the ordinary phrase by which man and nature are
contradistinguished. It is the original force of the word "brute," and even
"mute" and "dumb" do not convey the absence of sound, but the absence of
articulated sounds.
As soon as the human mind is intelligibly addressed by an outward image
exclusively of articulate speech, so soon does art commence. But please to
observe that I have laid particular stress on the words "human mind" - meaning
to exclude thereby all results common to man and all other sentient creatures,
and consequently confining myself to the effect produced by the congruity of
the animal impression with the reflective powers of the mind; so that not the
thing presented, but that which is re - presented by the thing, shall be the
source of the pleasure. In this sense nature itself is to a religious observer
the art of God; and for the same cause art itself might be defined as of a
middle quality between a thought and a thing, or as I said before, the union
and reconciliation of that which is nature with that which is exclusively
human. It is the figured language of thought, and is distinguished from nature
by the unity of all the parts in one thought or idea. Hence nature itself
would give us the impression of a work of art, if we could see the thought
which is present at once in the whole and in every part; and a work of art
will be just in proportion as it adequately conveys the thought, and rich in
proportion to the variety of parts which it holds in unity.
If, therefore, the term "mute" be taken as opposed not to sound but to
articulate speech, the old definition of painting will in fact be the true and
best definition of the fine arts in general, that is, muta poesis, mute poesy,
and so of course poesy. And, as all languages perfect themselves by a gradual
process of desynonymizing words originally equivalent, I have cherished the
wish to use the word "poesy" as the generic or common term, and to distinguish
that species of poesy which is not muta poesis by its usual name "poetry";
while of all the other species which collectively form the fine arts, there
would remain this as the common definition - that they all, like poetry, are
to express intellectual purposes, thoughts, conceptions, and sentiments which
have their origin in the human mind - not, however, as poetry does, by means
of articulate speech, but as nature or the divine art does, by form, color,
magnitude, proportion, or by sound, that is, silently or musically.
Well! it may be said - but who has ever thought otherwise? We all know
that art is the imitatress of nature. And, doubtless, the truths which I hope
to convey would be barren truisms, if all men meant the same by the words
"imitate" and "nature." But it would be flattering mankind at large, to
presume that such is the fact. First, to imitate. The impression on the wax is
not an imitation, but a copy, of the seal; the seal itself is an imitation.
But, further, in order to form a philosophic conception, we must seek for the
kind, as the heat in ice, invisible light, etc., whilst, for practical
purposes, we must have reference to the degree. It is sufficient that
philosophically we understand that in all imitation two elements must coexist,
and not only coexist, but must be perceived as coexisting. These two
constituent elements are likeness and unlikeness, or sameness and difference,
and in all genuine creations of art there must be a union of these disparates.
The artist may take his point of view where he pleases, provided that the
desired effect be perceptibly produced - that there be likeness in the
difference, difference in the likeness, and a reconcilement of both in one. If
there be likeness to nature without any check of difference, the result is
disgusting, and the more complete the delusion, the more loathsome the effect.
Why are such simulations of nature, as wax - work figures of men and women, so
disagreeable? Because not finding the motion and the life which we expected,
we are shocked as by a falsehood, every circumstance of detail, which before
induced us to be interested, making the distance from truth more palpable. You
set out with a supposed reality and are disappointed and disgusted with the
deception; while, in respect to a work of genuine imitation, you begin with an
acknowledged total difference, and then every touch of nature gives you the
pleasure of an approximation to truth. The fundamental principle of all this
is undoubtedly the horror of falsehood and the love of truth inherent in the
human breast. The Greek tragic dance rested on these principles, and I can
deeply sympathize in imagination with the Greeks in this favorite part of
their theatrical exhibitions, when I call to mind the pleasure I felt in
beholding the combat of the Horatii and Curiatii most exquisitely danced in
Italy to the music of Cimarosa.
Secondly, as to nature. We must imitate nature! yes, but what in nature -
all and everything? No, the beautiful in nature. And what then is the
beautiful? What is beauty? It is, in the abstract, the unity of the manifold,
the coalescence of the diverse; in the concrete, it is the union of the
shapely (formosum) with the vital. In the dead organic it depends on
regularity of form, the first and lowest species of which is the triangle with
all its modifications, as in crystals, architecture, etc.; in the living
organic it is not mere regularity of form, which would produce a sense of
formality; neither is it subservient to anything beside itself. If may be
present in a disagreeable object, in which the proportion of the parts
constitutes a whole; it does not arise from association, as the agreeable
does, but sometimes lies in the rupture of association; it is not different to
different individuals and nations, as has been said, nor is it connected with
the ideas of the good, or the fit, or the useful. The sense of beauty is
intuitive, and beauty itself is all that inspires pleasure without, and aloof
from, and even contrarily to, interest.
If the artist copies the mere nature, the natura naturata, what idle
rivalry! If he proceeds only from a given form, which is supposed to answer to
the notion of beauty, what an emptiness, what an unreality there always is in
his productions, as in Cipriani`s pictures! Believe me, you must master the
essence, the natura naturans, which presupposes a bond between nature in the
higher sense and the soul of man.
The wisdom in nature is distinguished from that in man by the co -
instantaneity of the plan and the execution; the thought and the product are
one, or are given at once; but there is no reflex act, and hence there is no
moral responsibility. In man there is reflection, freedom, and choice; he is,
therefore, the head of the visible creation. In the objects of nature are
presented, as in a mirror, all the possible elements, steps, and processes of
intellect antecedent to consciousness, and therefore to the full development
of the intelligential act; and man`s mind is the very focus of all the rays of
intellect which are scattered throughout the images of nature. Now, so to
place these images, totalized and fitted to the limits of the human mind, as
to elicit from, and to superinduce upon, the forms themselves the moral
reflections to which they approximate, to make the external internal, the
internal external, to make nature thought, and thought nature - this is the
mystery of genius in the fine arts. Dare I add that the genius must act on the
feeling, that body is but a striving to become mind - that it is mind in its
essence?
In every work of art there is a reconcilement of the external with the
internal; the conscious is so impressed on the unconscious as to appear in it;
as compared mere letters inscribed on a tomb with figures themselves
constituting the tomb. He who combines the two is the man of genius; and for
that reason he must partake of both. Hence there is in genius itself an
unconscious activity; nay, that is the genius in the man of genius. And this
is the true exposition of the rule that the artist must first eloign himself
from nature in order to return to her with full effect. Why this? Because if
he were to begin by mere painful copying, he would produce masks only, not
forms breathing life. He must out of his own mind create forms according to
the severe laws of the intellect, in order to generate in himself that co -
ordination of freedom and law, that involution of obedience in the prescript,
and of prescript in the impulse to obey, which assimilates him to nature, and
enables him to understand her. He merely absents himself for a season from
her, that his own spirit, which has the same ground with nature, may learn her
unspoken language in its main radicals, before he approaches to her endless
compositions of them. Yes, not to acquire cold notions - lifeless technical
rules - but living and life - producing ideas, which shall contain their own
evidence, the certainty that they are essentially one with the germinal causes
in nature - his consciousness being the focus and mirror of both - for this
does the artist for a time abandon the external real in order to return to it
with a complete sympathy with its internal and actual. For of all we see,
hear, feel, and touch the substance is and must be in ourselves; and therefore
there is no alternative in reason between the dreary (and thank heaven! almost
impossible) belief that everything around us is but a phantom, or that the
life which is in us is in them likewise; and that to know is to resemble, when
we speak of objects out of ourselves, even as within ourselves to learn is,
according to Plato, only to recollect; - the only effective answer to which,
that I have been fortunate to meet with, is that which Pope has consecrated
for future use in the line -
"And coxcombs vanquish Berkeley with a grin!"
The artist must imitate that which is within the thing, that which is
active through form and figure, and discourses to us by symbols - the
Naturgeist, or spirit of nature, as we unconsciously imitate those whom we
love; for so only can he hope to produce any work truly natural in the object
and truly human in the effect. The idea which puts the form together cannot
itself be the form. It is above form, and is its essence, the universal in the
individual, or the individuality itself - the glance and the exponent of the
indwelling power.
Each thing that lives has its moment of self-exposition, and so has each
period of each thing, if we remove the disturbing forces of accident. To do
this is the business of ideal art, whether in images of childhood, youth, or
age, in man or in woman. Hence a good portrait is the abstract of the
personal; it is not the likeness for actual comparison, but for recollection.
This explains why the likeness of a very good portrait is not always
recognized; because some persons never abstract, and among these are
especially to be numbered the near relations and friends of the subject, in
consequence of the constant pressure and check exercised on their minds by the
actual presence of the original. And each thing that only appears to live has
also its possible position of relation to life, as nature herself testifies,
who, where she cannot be, prophesies her being in the crystallized metal, or
the inhaling plant.
The charm, the indispensable requisite, of sculpture is unity of effect.
But painting rests in a material remoter from nature, and its compass is
therefore greater. Light and shade give external, as well internal, being even
with all its accidents, while sculpture is confined to the latter. And here I
may observe that the subjects chosen for works of art, whether in sculpture or
painting, should be such as really are capable of being expressed and conveyed
within the limits of those arts. Moreover, they ought to be such as will
affect the spectator by their truth, their beauty, or their sublimity, and
therefore they may be addressed to the judgment, the senses, or the reason.
The peculiarity of the impression which they may make may be derived either
from color and form, or from proportion and fitness, or from the excitement of
the moral feelings; or all these may be combined. Such works as do combine
these sources of effect must have the preference in dignity.
Imitation of the antique may be too exclusive, and may produce an
injurious effect on modern sculpture: - first, generally, because such an
imitation cannot fail to have a tendency to keep the attention fixed on
externals rather than on the thought within; - secondly, because, accordingly,
it leads the artist to rest satisfied with that which is always imperfect,
namely, bodily form, and circumscribes, his views of mental expression to the
ideas of power and grandeur only; - thirdly, because it induces an effort to
combine together two incongruous things, that is to say, modern feelings in
antique forms; - fourthly, because it speaks in a language, as it were,
learned and dead; the tones of which, being unfamiliar, leave the common
spectator cold and unimpressed; - and lastly, because it necessarily causes a
neglect of thoughts, emotions, and images of profounder interest and more
exalted dignity, as motherly, sisterly, and brotherly love, piety, devotion,
the divine become human - the Virgin, the Apostle, the Christ. The artist`s
principle in the statue of a great man should be the illustration of departed
merit; and I cannot but think that a skilful adoption of modern habiliments
would, in many instances, give a variety and force of effect which a bigoted
adherence to Greek or Roman costume precludes. It is, I believe, from artists
finding Greek models unfit for several important modern purposes that we see
so many allegorical figures on monuments and elsewhere. Painting was, as it
were, a new art, and being unshackled by old models it chose its own subjects,
and took an eagle`s flight. And a new field seems opened for modern sculpture
in the symbolical expression of the ends of life, as in Guy`s monument,
Chantrey`s children in Worcester Cathedral, etc.
Architecture exhibits the greatest extent of the difference from nature
which may exist in works of art. It involves all the powers of design, and is
sculpture and painting inclusively. It shows the greatness of man, and should
at the same time teach him humility.
Music is the most entirely human of the fine arts, and has the fewest
analog in nature. Its first delightfulness is simple accordance with the ear;
but it is an associated thing, and recalls the deep emotions of the past with
an intellectual sense of proportion. Every human feeling is greater and larger
than the exciting cause - a proof, I think, that man is designed for a higher
state of existence; and this is deeply implied in music in which there is
always something more and beyond the immediate expression.
With regard to works in all the branches of the fine arts, I may remark
that the pleasure arising from novelty must of course be allowed its due place
and weight. This pleasure consists in the identity of two opposite elements -
that is to say, sameness and variety. If in the midst of the variety there be
not some fixed object for the attention, the unceasing succession of the
variety will prevent the mind from observing the difference of the individual
objects; and the only thing remaining will be the succession, which will then
produce precisely the same effect as sameness. This we experience when we let
the trees or hedges pass before the fixed eye during a rapid movement in a
carriage, or, on the other hand, when we suffer a file of soldiers or ranks of
men in procession to go on before us without resting the eye on anyone in
particular. In order to derive pleasure from the occupation of the mind, the
principle of unity must always be present, so that in the midst of the
multeity the cetripetal force be never suspended, nor the sense be fatigued by
the predominance of the centrifugal force. This unity in multiety I have
elsewhere stated as the principle of beauty. It is equally the source of
pleasure in variety, and in fact a higher term including both. What is the
seclusive or distinguishing term between them?
Remember that there is a difference between form as proceeding, and shape
as superinduced; - the latter is either the death or the imprisonment of the
thing; - the former is its self-witnessing and self-effected sphere of agency.
Art would or should be the abridgment of nature. Now the fullness of nature is
without character, as water is purest when without taste, smell, or color; but
this is the highest, the apex only - it is not the whole. The object of art is
to give the whole ad hominem; hence each step of nature hath its ideal, and
hence the possibility of a climax up to the perfect form of a harmonized
chaos.
To the idea of life victory or strife is necessary; as virtue consists
not simply in the absence of vices, but in the overcoming of them. So it is in
beauty. The sight of what is subordinated and conquered heightens the strength
and the pleasure; and this should be exhibited by the artist either
inclusively in his figure, or else out of it, and beside it to act by way of
supplement and contrast. And with a view to this, remark the seeming identity
of body and mind in infants, and thence the loveliness of the former; the
commencing separation in boyhood, and the struggle of equilibrium in youth:
thence onward the body is first simply indifferent; then demanding the
translucency of the mind not to be worse than indifferent; and finally all
that presents the body as body becoming almost of an excremental nature.^2
[Footnote 2: The discussion, like so much of Coleridge`s work, seems to have
been left incomplete.]
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